

## Message Text

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ACTION AF-18

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-11 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07

PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 IO-14 SAM-01 SCS-03

SCA-01 PER-05 OPR-02 A-01 FS-01 M-02 OC-06 CCO-00

OMB-01 CIEP-03 AID-20 SY-04 DRC-01 PC-10 SCCT-02 /181 W  
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O P 081455Z AUG 74

FM AMCONSUL LUANDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2863

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY

AMCONSUL CAPETOWN PRIORITY

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

CINCLANT NORFOK VA

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMCONSUL LOURENCO MARQUES PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY

AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L LUANDA 0689

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT AO

SUBJECT: IN VIEW INCREASING PROPSECTS FOR CIVIL WAR IN ANGOLA  
POST PLANS RECOMMEND AMCIT DEPENDENTS LEAVE

CAPETOWN FOR EMBASSY; ADDIS FOR RSS; CINCEUR FOR POLAD; CINCLANT  
FOR POLAD; NAIROBI FOR RCO

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: ANGOLAN JUNTA REMAINS UNABLE FORM  
PROVISIONAL COALITION GOVERNMENT AND SEES DECLARATION  
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STATE OF SIEGE NOW ONLY POSSIBILITY REGAIN CIVIL CONTROL.

FOR THESE REASONS PLUS BASIC ANALYSIS BELOW POST PLANS  
RECOMMEND MORNING AUG 9 THAT AMCIT DEPENDENTS LEAVE. END  
SUMMARY

2. ANALYSIS: POLITICAL PICTURE HERE COMPRISED OF THREE BLACK  
GROUPINGS, EACH WITH SPECIFIC STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES, BUT  
NONE WITH THE REQUISITE POWER ASSUME CONTROL WITH MINIMUM  
BLOODLETTING.

A. MPLA. HAS SYMPATHY MAJORITY OF BLACKS IN LUANDA AND  
COMMANDS SOME WHITE SUPPORT. CONSIDERED BY PRESENT JUNTA A  
LOGICAL "FIRST AMONG EQUALS" IN A COALITION GOVERNMENT. MPLA  
HAS ONLY RUDIMENTARY ORGANIZATION IN REST OF ANGOLA AND SOME  
MINOR MILITARY STRENGTH IN EAST AND BORDERS OF CABINDA.  
NEAREST SIGNIFICANT MILITARY CONCENTRATIONS ARE  
BRAZZAVILLE AND ZAMBIA, TOO FAR AWAY TO HAVE ANY EARLY BEARING  
ON SITUATION WITHOUT AIRLIFT. BY ITSELF MPLA CANNOT HOPE TO  
SEIZE POWER BUT COULD MAKE LUANDA UNTENABLE FOR ANY GROUP  
WHICH DOES. THEY HOPE TO HAVE REINS OF GOVERNMENT TURNED  
OVER TO THEM BY JUNTA.

B. FNLA. ONLY LIBERATION GROUP WITH SIZEABLE FORCES  
(4,000 MEN) CLOSE TO LUANDA, NEAREST FEW ARE 75 KM DISTANT. THEY  
HAVE LARGEST OVERALL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, INCLUDING UP  
TO 7,000 TRAINING IN ZAIRE. ALTHOUGH THEY ENJOY SUPPORT OF  
MOBUTU, THEY ARE UNIVERSALLY HATED BY ALL OTHER GROUPS,  
INCLUDING MPLA, UNITA, SOUTHERN BLACKS, WHITES, PORTUGUESE  
ARMY. FEW ADHERENTS IN LUANDA AND NO KNOWN SUPPORT IN REST  
OF ANGOLA OUTSIDE BAKONGO TRIBE. THEIR FORCES INSIDE ANGOLA,  
WHILE SIZEABLE, ARE NOT THOUGHT TO BE CAPABLE OF MUCH EXCEPT  
SURVIVAL, AND THEY LACK LOGISTICS TO GET THEIR LARGE NUMBERS INTO  
LUANDA QUICKLY.

C. UNITA. MILITARILY WEAK (500 MEN), ISOLATED IN  
EASTERN ANGOLA AND WITHOUT FOREIGN SUPPORT. HOWEVER THEY MAY  
HAVE FORGED ALLIANCE WITH CENTER-RIGHT WHITE GROUPS WHO HAVE  
MADE UNITA KNOWN IN LUANDA IN LAST FEW DAYS. THEY APPARENTLY  
GAINING WIDE SUPPORT AMONG POPULOUS SOUTHERN BLACKS AND GAINING  
SUPPORT FROM WHITES BECAUSE OF THEIR MODERATE POSITION.  
PROBABLE THEY COULD WIN REFERENDUM IF ONE HELD. THEIR  
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ABILITY PROJECT POWER WHOLLY DEPENDENT ON WHITE ALLIES.  
LATTER SEE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE COUP TO PREVENT "COMMUNIST  
JUNTA" FROM TURNING OVER POWER TO MPLA, AND ARE TAKING  
STEPS TO THAT END (SEPTTEL).

2. SO FAR ANGOLAN JUNTA UNABLE FORM GOVERNMENT. NO IMPORTANT  
GROUPS HAVE YET ACCEPTED POSITIONS, ALTHOUGH MPLA, ONCE  
THEY SORT OUT LEADERSHIP SCRAMBLE, MAY WELL AGREE COME IN.

JUNTA WIDELY THOUGHT FAVOR MPLA WHILE HOPING AT LEAST SOMEONE (EXCEPT FNLA) WILL COME FORWARD TO WHOM THEY CAN TURN OVER ANGOLA. REFERENDUM NO LONGER MENTIONED. DAILY DETERIORATION OF SITUATION COULD LEAD ARMY TO WITHDRAW TO BARRACKS OR JUNTA TO ABDICATE.

3. COOPERATION OF MPLA AND FNLA IN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT UNLIKELY AT BEST, AND IMPOSSIBLE IF NETO EMERGES AS HEAD OF MPLA. EVEN IF TWO WOULD AGREE TO MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE, IT WOULD NOT LAST. HATREDS ARE TOO OLD, TOO DEEP AND POWER BASES TOO DISSIMILAR FOR ONE GROUP TO TRUST OTHER. FNLA POLITICIANS IN LUANDA WOULD BE IN CONSTANT FEAR OF ASSASSINATION. MPLA COULD NEVER BE SURE THAT ROBERTO WOULD NOT BE ABLE, USING MOBUTU'S HELP, TO MOVE HIS FORCES INTO POSITION TO DOMINATE LUANDA (ONLY WATER SUPPLY FOR CITY LIES ON EDGE OF FNLA AREA).

4. PROGNOSIS: POSSIBLE CIVIL WAR WITH NO GROUP ABLE CLEARLY DOMINATE WITHOUT ACTIVE SUPPORT PORTUGUESE ARMY. IF ARMY DOES NOT CRACK AND DECIDES BACK EITHER MPLA OR UNITA-WHITE FACTION, A SOLUTION COULD BE IMPOSED. HOWEVER, IF ARMY WASHES HANDS OF MATTER, THEN A LONG, BLOODY CIVIL WAR LIKELY FOLLOW. EVEN IF ARMY STAYS BUT DECIDES BACK MPLA, UNITA'S WHITE ALLIES SEEM DETERMINED ATTEMPT COUP.

5. POST'S ASSESSMENT AND PLANNED ACTION:

WHILE IT POSSIBLE ARMY WILL MANAGE KEEP LID ON AND ESTABLISH GOVERNMENT, CONGEN FEELS PROSPECT LESS LIKELY WITH EACH PASSING NIGHT OF FIGHTING IN MUCEQUES. WIDESPREAD, LONG-TERM URBAN VIOLENCE NOW SEEMS MORE PROBABLE THAN STABILITY. UNLESS UNEXPECTED POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT OCCURS POST PLANS SUGGEST COMPANIES AND INDIVIDUALS MORNING AUG 9 THAT  
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DEPENDENTS LEAVE. LOGISTICS FOLLOW IN SEPTTEL.  
PORTER

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## Message Attributes

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